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Abstract
The past fifty years have witnessed two simultaneous and accelerating trends: an explosive
growth in population and a steep increase in resource depletion and environmental degradation.
These trends have fueled the debate on the link between population and environment that began
150 years earlier, when Malthus voiced his concern about the ability of the earth and its finite
resources to feed an exponentially growing population.
The purpose of this study is to review the literature on population and environment and to
identify the main strands of thought and the assumptions that lie behind them.  The author begins
with a review of the historical perspective. He then reviews and assesses the evidence on the
relationship between population and environment, focusing on selected natural and
environmental resources: land use, water use, local pollution, deforestation and climate change.
The author also reviews selected recent macro and micro perspectives.  The new macro
perspective introduces the environment-income relationship and examines the role of population
growth and density in mediating this relationship.  The new micro perspective introduces the
close relationship between poverty and environmental degradation, also examining the roles of
gender in decision-making and the role of children as economic assets in fertility decisions.
Finally, the author carries out a comparative assessment of the approaches and methods
employed in the literature to explain the wide variation in findings and predictions.
This literature review demonstrates that there is little agreement on the relationship between
population and growth, and even whether any relationship exists at all.  Empirical research has
been unable to resolve the issue because of limited data, divergent methodologies, and varying
levels of analysis.
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The past two hundred years have witnessed two exploding trends: rapid population
growth following the decline in mortality due to both the medical revolution and the
improvement in living conditions and a steep increase of resource depletion and
environmental degradation following the industrial and agricultural revolutions.  Both of
these trends have accelerated over the past 50 years, fueling the debate on the linkages
between population and environment that began 150 years earlier with Malthus’ concern
about the capacity of fixed land to feed an exponentially growing population. While
population grew at rates beyond Malthus’ imagination (see Figure 1), food production
expanded even faster, and the debate has shifted to concerns about the role of population
growth in the depletion of other natural resources, such as fossil fuels and minerals; in the
degradation of renewable resources, such as forests, fisheries and biodiversity; and in the
despoliation of local environment and the global climate.
The analysis and debate have been carried out on two distinct levels: the macro level,
involving large units of analysis, such as the nation, the region or the globe; and the
micro level, involving small units of analysis, such as the household, the family and the
community.  Some studies are content with establishing simple correlations, while others
involve sophisticated econometric analysis, attempting to ascertain the existence and
direction of causality.  Yet other studies involve complex systems with feedback loops or
large simulation models with scenario analysis.  Inevitably, they reach different
conclusions even when they analyze the same body of data because of differences in
perspectives, levels of aggregation and methods of analysis.
Another critical difference is the degree to which the studies take into account the
relevant context and which intervening, mediating or interacting variables have been
included in the analysis.  For example, technology, market failures, international trade,2
Figure 1. World Population Growth: Linear Scale vs. Ratio Scale
*Ratio scale shows constant percentage rate as a straight, upward-sloping line; linear scale shows absolute
increases, so steady percentage growth rate appears to curve up.
Sources: Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, Atlas of World Population History; U.N.
Secretariat, World Population Prospects:  The 1998 Revision; Census Bureau.  Figure
obtained from http://www.forbes.com/forbes/99/01/25/6302058chart1.htm.3
economic growth, poverty and mobility are some of the factors that influence population-
environment interactions, but are not consistently brought into the analytical frameworks
and the empirical investigations of these studies.  Left-out variables bias the results in one
or the other direction, creating confusion for the reader.  Ultimately, it is the attempt to
understand and explain along disciplinary lines phenomena that span several disciplines,
such as demography, ecology, sociology, anthropology, political economy, and
economics, which is at the root of the disparity of perspectives, findings and policy
prescriptions.
The purpose of this study is to review the literature on population and
environment to identify the main strands of thought and the salient features and
assumptions that lie behind them, and to guide the reader through what is a very diverse
and confusing, yet rapidly expanding, field of study.  We begin with a review of the
historical perspective from Malthus and his capitalist and socialist critics, through
Boserup’s thesis and other neoclassical economists, to the recent ideological war between
the “neo-Malthusians” and the “cornucopians.”  In section three, we review and assess
the evidence on interaction between population and environment focusing on selected
natural and environmental resources: land use, water use, local pollution, deforestation
and climate change.  The following two sections review selected recent macro and micro
perspectives.  The new macro perspective introduces the environment-income
relationship (known also as the Environmental Kuznets Curve) and examines the role of
population growth and density in mediating this relationship.  The new micro perspective
introduces the feedbacks between population growth, poverty and environmental
degradation and examines the role of gender in decision-making and the role played by
children as economic assets in fertility decisions in a world of market and policy failures.
Finally, in section six, we carry out a comparative assessment of predictions, approaches
and methods employed in the literature to explain the wide variation in findings and
predictions.  The study closes with concluding remarks.4
2. Historical Perspective
The relationship between population and environment has a long history, although
in different times it may have been expressed in somewhat different contexts, such as the
relationship of population growth to governance (Plato and Aristotle), to food production
(Malthus), to agricultural growth (Boserup), to resource availability (Neoclassical
economists, Simon), to pollution (Meadows), and to land degradation (Blaikie and
Moore).  Development economists have long been concerned about the impact of
population growth and related demographic transition on the rate of economic growth,
while neoclassical economists sought to redress the classical economists’ concern of
whether it is possible to maintain an increasing or even steady standard of living in the
face of finite resources and a growing population.  In more recent years, questions have
been raised regarding the effect of population growth on climate change and on
biodiversity loss. In addition to the effects of population growth on global resource
availability, on the global environment and on the prospects for continued growth of the
world economy, there are also serious concerns as to the effects of population growth on
local resources such as soil, water, forest, fisheries, pastures and the urban environment.
In what follows, we will first review the historical perspective leading up to the
modern debate on population and environment, from the utopians through the
Malthusians and neo-Malthusians to the cornucopians.
2.1 The Utopians
The utopians have their roots in ancient Greece where the need to balance
population with resources was taken for granted and pursued through a policy of
progressive colonization of new areas.  The utopian view of zero population growth was
recommended by Plato in his Republic; Aristotle viewed a populous city as too hard to
govern.  The modern population debate began in 1761 with Robert Wallace, who in his
Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature and Providence, wrote about an egalitarian utopia
that would self-destruct through overpopulation. Wallace’s argument was that an
egalitarian society, while otherwise desirable, would lead to a decline in infant mortality
(as children are better cared for in such a society), leading to growth of population
beyond the earth’s capacity to support it.  Wallace did not expect population to be5
controlled by famines, but by violence and war, caused by conflict over socially
intolerable rules to control population growth.  William Godwin in 1793 responded to
Wallace through his Inquiry Concerning Political Justice by arguing that “The number of
inhabitants in a country will perhaps never be found in the ordinary course of affairs,
greatly to increase beyond the facility of subsistence.”  Even if it did, he argued, the earth
could support increasing populations for many centuries; he saw no reason to “conceive
discouragements for so distant a contingency.”  To the contrary, he saw a progressive
weakening of people’s “eagerness for the gratification of the senses” and propagation,
and the end of selfishness, injustice, crime and war.  Godwin’s utopian optimism
provoked the response of Thomas Malthus, five years later (1798), in his Essay on the
Principle of Population.
2.2 Malthus and Ricardo
Malthus argued that population grows geometrically, while food production can
only grow arithmetically.  Therefore, population growth will ultimately outstrip the
ability of the economy to meet the demand for food.  Since food is essential to survival,
the shortage of food would keep a check on further population growth, through disease
and death of excess members among the lower classes, and late marriage or no marrying
at all by the middle class.  To understand Malthus’ dire prediction, it is important to
consider (a) his cynicism about human beings, which he viewed as “inert, sluggish, and
averse from labor, unless compelled by necessity,” and (b) his social status as a son of
landowners, writing from a position of threatened privilege on the heels of the French
Revolution and growing demands for radical reform in Britain.  His theorem was meant
to prove the impossibility of all schemes to improve the lot of workers or to redistribute
income.  He concluded that inequality (indeed poverty) was inevitable and useful, as an
incentive for work by the poor and benevolence by the rich.
Five years later, in a second edition, Malthus virtually reversed his views,
stressing the power of self-control among all classes and arguing that, if this is practiced,
population growth need not outpace food supply, in effect anticipating family planning.
Furthermore, he argued that “an increase in population, where it follows its natural order,
is both a great positive good in itself and is absolutely necessary to a further increase in6
annual production of the land and labor of any country”, in effect anticipating (and
endorsing) the cornucopian view of almost two centuries later.
However, it is his earlier views, as appeared in the first edition, that are
remembered and have become the Malthusian school of thought on population.
Following Malthus, the classical economists stressed the difficulty of sustaining a rising
(or even steady) standard of living with finite resources and a growing population.  In
1817, Ricardo, in The Principle of Political Economy and Taxation, advanced the “iron
law of wages” according to which, wages can never rise above (or fall below) the
minimal level required for the subsistence of workers and the children needed to replace
them.
2.3 The Socialist and Capitalist Critique:  From Karl Marx to Henry George
The Malthusian view, as expressed in Malthus’ first edition of his essay on
population, was heavily criticized by both socialists and capitalists, for different reasons.
Karl Marx called Malthus’ essay a “libel on the human race,” and argued that
“overpopulation” was the outcome of the laws of capitalism, not the laws of nature.  It
was not a true overpopulation, but a surplus of unemployed laborers created by
capitalism’s investment in machinery.  Engels wrote that “the pressure of population is
not upon the means of subsistence but upon the means of employment;  mankind could
multiply more rapidly than is compatible with modern bourgeois society.”
Henry George, on the other hand, in his Progress and Poverty (1879), saw
population growth as a source of wealth and overpopulation not as a cause but a
consequence of poverty.  The real causes of poverty are unjust laws, warfare, excessive
rents, and insecure land tenure, which condemn people to be poor in the midst of wealth
and to have more children than the rich.  He attributed famines to oppressive
governments and extortion by landlords, rather than any imbalance between population
and food production.
According to Henry George, population growth and population density are
catalysts of wealth through increased cooperation and specialization:  extra labor results
in extra productivity of land and this results in extra food, more than sufficient to feed the
extra population; hence the Malthusian prediction of overpopulation and famines does7
not occur as long as there are no distortions that prevent the productive application of the
extra labor to land.
Of course, as an American, Henry George had a different perspective than the
European writers: land abundance versus severe land scarcity.  Ricardo and other
classical economists were concerned that the law of diminishing marginal productivity
would inevitably result in decline in per capita incomes, as successive increases of labor
applied to a fixed factor (land) result in the marginal product of labor falling below the
average product.  George, writing from the perspective of a land-abundant, labor-scarce
environment, saw population growth as a source of economies of scale and specialization,
rather than as a source of diminishing marginal productivity.
2.4 The Boserup Thesis of Induced Innovation
Almost a century later, George’s ideas found fertile ground in Ester Boserup’s
seminal book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, which turned Malthus on his head
by suggesting that it is not the growth of agriculture (food) that determines population
growth but the reverse: population growth determines agricultural growth.  Boserup
(1965, 1976, 1980) discussed how, in response to greater population density and lower
yields, farmers, who began as shifting cultivators, reduced their fallow periods and began
to use the plow, manure, crop-rotation, irrigation, and multiple cropping to maintain and
increase crop yields (see Table 1).  These developments, which help keep food
production apace with population growth, would not have taken place without the
pressure of population growth: all of them involved more labor, and people would not
have used more labor if they were not compelled by population growth.  She argued that
communities with sustained population growth have a better chance for genuine
economic development through technological innovation and substitution than
communities with small and stagnant populations, which are unlikely to advance much
beyond primitive agriculture.  Boserup recognized that land degradation may take place
as fallow periods are excessively shortened or hills are cultivated but she argued that
terracing, fertilizer, and other technological advances could limit the damage.8
Table 1. Boserup: Agricultural Systems and Population Density













Wild plants, roots, fruits and nuts gathered
Possibly domestic animals
1 or 2 crops followed by 15-25 years fallow
2 or more crops followed by 8-10 years
fallow
1-2 crops followed by 1-2 years fallow
1 crop each year with few months fallow







Source: Boserup, 1981, p. 9, Table 3.2, p. 19 and Table 3.7, p. 23.9
2.5 The Neoclassical Economists
The Boserup thesis was subsequently extended to the industrial revolution
(Boserup 1980), and formed the backbone of the neoclassical approach to population
growth and development.  Neoclassical economists (like the classical economists) are
concerned with whether economy can sustain a rising (or even steady) standard of living,
given finite resources and a growing population.  But unlike their predecessors, the
neoclassical economists, in order to determine whether output growth can keep pace with
population growth, examine the extent to which technological progress and substitution
of scarce factors with more abundant ones can offset diminishing marginal productivity
resulting from fixed factors.  As land resources become increasingly scarce, land prices
will rise and incentives will thus, increase for people to (a) substitute more abundant
resources such as labor, fertilizer and irrigation for land; and (b) to develop new
technologies (such as high yield crop varieties) to increase yields from existing land
(intensification), as well as to farm previously unused land (extensification).  The key
assumption here is that markets are well-functioning, in the sense that neither market
failures (insecure property rights; pervasive externalities) nor policy distortions (e.g.
taxes on intensification inputs) constrain efficient response.  Furthermore, the public-
good aspects of new agricultural technologies
1 call for a certain level of public sector
involvement in or subsidization of the development and dissemination of new agricultural
technologies in response to a growing land scarcity.
Under the neoclassical paradigm, population growth may lead to land degradation
and retard agricultural growth, if markets are inefficient or distorted and/or the
technological and substitution responses lagged significantly behind population growth.
For example, artificially low producer prices and insecure land tenure rob the farmers of
the incentives to practice soil conservation or to intensify agricultural production, while
subsidies for forest land clearing has made it (artificially) profitable for people to settle in
the Amazon or on Indonesia’s outer islands where agricultural production is not
sustainable.  Removal of policy failures without concurrent correction of market failures
may not reduce environmental degradation; for example, removal of kerosene or fertilizer
                                                          
1 Some new agricultural technologies (e.g. seed selection, biological pest control, etc.) may be regarded as
private rather than public goods.  See Umali and Schwartz (1994).10
subsidies may accelerate deforestation if the relevant externalities are not also
internalized.  Even if markets are not distorted, it takes time for farmers and governments
first to perceive and then to react to growing land scarcities by developing or adopting
more efficient and sustainable technologies: lagged response to population-induced
resource scarcities in this case results in land degradation rather than in land
improvement and intensification.
2.6 The neo-Malthusians
The neo-Malthusian school of thought was launched in 1968 with the publication
of The Population Bomb by American ecologist Paul Ehrlich.  He termed over-population
as the biggest threat to terrestrial life that the planet faces, short of a thermo-nuclear war,
and predicted vast famines sometime between 1970 and 1985; he supported compulsory
measures to control population and opposed food aid to poor and populous countries such
as India where “the unbalance between food and population is hopeless.”
Under conditions of high infant mortality, ensuring that a child is alive to provide
care and sustenance when the parents are old raises the demand for children above the
number dictated by the “children as ends” motive.  Considering further that in many
societies daughters are considered a net drain on household resources, or, in any case,
insufficient security for old age, the strive for sons results in a larger number of children
being desired than otherwise.  May and Heer (1968) estimated that in the 1960s, an
Indian couple needed to have 6.3 children to have a virtual certainty that a surviving son
would be available as a source of old age security, when the father reaches 68.
Ehrlich’s apocalyptic views were richer in rhetoric than in evidence.  The Limits
to Growth, published four years later by Dennis Meadows and his fellow Club of Rome
members attempted to provide the evidence that Ehrlich (1968) lacked.  They used a
systems dynamics computer model with feedback loops to simulate likely futures of the
world economy in terms of population, resource use, food, industrial output and
pollution.  They predicted that, under a business as usual scenario, there will be a
dramatic shortage of mineral and land resources early in the 21
st century leading to a
catastrophic collapse of the population by the year 2025 and a dismal existence of any
survivors.  Alternatively, more optimistic scenarios did not fare much better: the growth11
of population and output always overshot the earth’s carry capacity either in terms of
resource availability or in terms of assimilative capacity for waste.  With growing
population against fixed land resource, it is a matter of time (a few decades) before the
limits of arable land are reached and agricultural production per capita declines leading to
famines.  Even if, somehow, food yields are raised, the rise of industrial output will
exhaust energy and mineral resources leading again to a collapse; and even if this is
somehow avoided expanded industrial production would generate pollution levels beyond
the earth’s assimilative capacity, leading again to a collapse, within a century.
The dire predictions of the Limits to Growth is the direct consequence of the
assumptions that went into the model: (a) fixed carrying capacity in terms of resource
availability and assimilative capacity for waste; (b) exponentially growing population; (c)
no technological change; (d) no substitutability of more abundant resources for more
scarce ones; (e) no prices that rise with scarcity and induce substitution and technological
innovation; and (f) no income effects and structural changes and related feedback
systems.  As a consequence of these assumptions, there is no smooth transition, no
gradual slowing down of resource use as scarcity increases; the world consumes
successively larger amounts of depletable resources until they are all gone.  Under these
assumptions, their doomsday prediction was mathematically inevitable.  Only one avenue
of escape was left open: stabilization of population at 1970 levels (a virtual impossibility
given the demographic momentum), a massive reduction of resource use and pollution
per unit of output, de-industrialization of the world economy, a shift to solar energy and
recycling of all wastes including sewage.  The authors did not attempt to assess the
political feasibility and economic and the social costs of the heavy-handed government
intervention needed to bring about such a scenario of survival.  Twenty years later, in a
sequel to the 1972 book, Donella Meadows’ Beyond the Limits attempts to correct some
of the deficiencies of the Limits to Growth by allowing for technological progress and
limited negative feedback loops from the economic to the natural system.  However, the
dominance of the positive feedback loops coupled with fixed limits on essential resources
and exponential population growth and leads to the same doomsday predictions even
somewhat modified in nature and timing.12
2.7 The Cornucopians
Partly in reaction to the neo-Malthusians doomsday prediction, Herman Kahn and
associates presented an alternative vision in their 1976 book The Next 200 Years: A
Scenario for America and the World.  The central thrust of this vision is the continuing
evolution of technological progress and its ability to push back the resource limits until
they are no longer constraining economic growth.  They postulated an S-shaped logistic
curve for population growth with the point of inflection around the mid-1970s.  Looking
backward from the mid-seventies one sees exponential population growth but looking
forward one should expect a continuing but steadily declining population growth.  They
expect population to level off by the middle of the 22
nd century at around 15 billion
people and average world income per capita to rise to $20,000 in 1975 constant dollars by
the year 2176, implying an almost hundred-fold increase in world gross national product
(GNP) from its mid-seventies levels.  This contrast with the Limits to Growth prediction
that continued economic growth is not only infeasible but it would lead to disaster and
called for immediate limits to population and cessation of economic growth.
Two factors account for these widely diverging visions of the future.  First, Khan
and associates dispense with the idea of exponential population growth as a myopic
extrapolation of recent trends.  Second, they introduce technological progress that
responds to approaching resource limits: as a certain limit is reached a new technology is
introduced that either permanently removes the limit or buys time until a future
technology can remove it.  The supply of food is not constrained by fixed arable land, as
in the case of the Limits to Growth model; instead, the availability of physical resources
expands through better farming techniques, new higher yielding seeds, irrigation systems,
and ultimately hydroponics, a farming process that uses no soil.  Similarly, energy is
ultimately derived from clear and inexhaustible solar power, once the limits of more
conventional sources are approached to justify it economically.  It is thus the replacement
of the positive feedback loops of the Limits to Growth model by the negative feedback
loops of The Next 200 Years model that largely accounts for the reversal of the results.
Khan and associates argue that in light of their vision it is both unnecessary and
unethical to put any restrictions on either population or economic growth, condemning13
developing countries to poverty.  Continued economic growth is possible and would
benefit all, especially the poor.
Julian Simon, in his 1981 book The Ultimate Resource and the follow-up book on
the Theory of Population and Economic Growth (1986), established the ultimate
feedback loop between population size and human ingenuity that brings about
technological progress in response to scarcity.  According to Simon, human ingenuity is
the ultimate resource; more people means more brains devising solutions to emerging
problems.  More people means more ideas, bigger markets, economies of scale, more
specialization and easier communications and ultimately, more resources.  Simon
marshaled evidence showing that the real costs of non-renewable resources fell over time
both in terms of wages and consumer prices, signaling increased rather than reduced
resource availability.  The same is true of agricultural land while pollution control
measures are tightened over time as wealth brings about demands for a cleaner
environment.  It is not that shortages do not occur, but when they do, they are temporary
and unleash human incentives that develops new superior substitutes and improved
methods of production that leaves us better off after the shortage than before it.  Thus,
population growth provides both the incentive (higher costs of existing resources and
promising benefits from substitutes) and the means (additional brains and ingenuity) for
advancement that continuously pushes back resource limits and creates wealth.  Simon
went further to argue that more people are desirable not only from a production
standpoint but also from a consumption perspective.  Other things being equal (e.g. per
capita consumption), the more people, the better.   According to Simon, population
growth permits us to achieve the greatest good for the greatest amount of human beings
both existing and possible, thus extending Bentham’s welfare rule
2 to those unborn.
The views of Herman Khan and Julian Simon are so optimistic that they came to be
known as “cornucopia” and the extreme antithesis of the Malthusian and neo-Malthusian
doomsday predictions.  A third view, represented by Susan George, Piers Blaikie and
Frances Moore Lappé, exonerates population growth from being a cause to being a
symptom of deeper rooted problems of exploitation, expropriation, inequality and
                                                          
2 Jeremy Bentham founded the utilitarian school of moral philosophy, which considers the highest good to
be the greatest happiness for the greatest number.14
injustice perpetrated by colonialism, imperialism and multinational companies that
conspire to keep poor people in perpetual poverty.  The poor are forced to have large
families so that the children can work and supplement the family income and support
their parents in their old age.  But since poor people are left with only small and marginal
pieces of land, they are forced to overexploit them and to encroach on forest lands to
supplement their income.  Under these conditions, population growth, which is greater
among the poor, results in deforestation and land degradation.
2.8  The Theory of Optimum Population
Yet another strand of thought postulates the existence of an optimum population.  As
population grows, two opposing forces are put into action: a) marginal and average labor
productivity diminish as each person has a smaller share of land and natural resources to
work with, and b) division of labor, specialization, cooperation and scale economies
expand with a larger population.  The optimum population is reached when these
opposing forces exactly cancel each other.  Optimum population is a dynamic, not a static
concept, constantly being shifted by technology.  As Wicksell (1920) put it: "The
profusion of new discoveries and the growth of technical knowledge will most often, if
not always, displace it."  Cannan (1928 p. 61) was even more explicit about the dynamics
of optimum population theory: "We have to treat the ideal or optimum in regard to
population as being the right movement (i.e. increase or decrease) of population rather
than define it in reference to particular point in time.  The right movement is that which
will give the largest returns to industry in the long-run, the interests of the people of all
generations being taken into account."
Historically, the concept of optimum population dates back to the works of Plato and
Aristotle, who postulated the existence of an ideal city size.  John Stuart Mill (1848),
Wagner (1893), Julius Wolf (1901, 1908), and Schmoller (1919) along with others have
discussed the concept prior to Wicksell (1910) and Cannan (1928) who are credited with
originating the concept independently.
Theoretically, the concept of optimum population has played an important role in
models of economic growth.  Earlier models, such as Dasgupta (1969), Meade (1955) and
Lane (1977) treated population change as exogenous.  More recent models, such as15
Dasgupta (1984) and Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1987), Schmitt-Rink (1989) endogenize
population growth and dismiss population policy.  Following the seminal contribution of
Becker (1960, there has been a proliferation of microeconomic models of endogenous
fertility and family size.  In these models, different population sizes are optimal
depending on what is being maximized: life expectancy, gross domestic product, income
per capita or sustainable consumption (total or per capita).  For example, Singer (1971)
argued that there exists an optimal population size that maximizes income per capita.  In
practical terms, the concept has played a significant role in the discussion of the effects of
population growth on land productivity.  The concepts of over-population and under-
population as applied to specific countries are derived from an implicit notion that there
is (or must be) a population size that is optimal in the sense that it maximizes well-being
or minimizes environmental impact and the like.
3. Population and Environment: Evidence of Interaction
Since there is no single satisfactory index of the state of the environment, the
relationship between population and environment is usually analyzed in terms of
individual resources or dimensions of environmental quality.  The earlier debate from
Malthus to Boserup was conducted in terms of food availability to feed a growing
population.  The debate of the neo-Malthusians versus the cornucopians centered on the
availability of non-renewable resources such as minerals and fuels and the environmental
quality threatened by industrial pollution.  At present, the degradation of the global
biodiversity and climate are receiving most of the attention.  In what follows, we examine
the evidence of interaction between population on the one hand and selected resources
and pollutants on the other.
3.1 Population and Land Use
Population growth affects land use mainly through extensification and
intensification of agricultural production.  There is both historical and empirical evidence
that different population densities and different population growth rates produce different
land use patterns and changes over time.  Analytically, more people need more food,
which can come only from either expansion of agriculture into new lands, or use of16
existing agricultural land more intensively, or a combination of the two depending on
relative costs, themselves a function of technological, institutional and ecological factors.
Wolman (1983) presents historical evidence that land use patterns over the past 6,000
years are associated with the growth of human population.  Until most recently, the
increase in agricultural production needed to meet the needs of expanded population took
place through the expansion of land under cultivation, the shortening of fallow periods
and the application of more labor.  Dramatic increases in agricultural productivity during
the past 50 years have come from new biological and chemical technologies (fertilizers
and new crop varieties), as well as from new mechanical technologies in land-abundant,
labor-scarce countries (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Technology has provided both the
means to reduce land extensification and the capacity of man to alter the landscape,
which has accelerated land use change (Burringh and Dudal, 1987).
Bilsborrow and Geores (1993) present cross-sectional evidence of a positive
relationship between a country’s population density and the percentage of the country’s
arable land that is used for agricultural production.  Panayotou (1993) presents time series
evidence of association between population growth and land use change over three
decades (1960-1990) in Thailand.  Evanson (1993) presents evidence from India that
shows how population growth induced people to cultivate additional land as well as to
use existing land more productively.  Mink (1993) found some association between the
average annual change in population and average annual change in the agricultural land
area (see Figure 2).  Tiffen et al (1994) and Tiffen (1995), using data on long-term trends
in population and soil erosion in the Machakos district in Kenya, show that population
density was the driving force in soil conservation and environmental recovery in the area.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the district was sparsely populated and the inhabited area was
treeless and "characterized by widespread erosion and degraded communal lands, leading
to increasing poverty and frequent need for famine relief" (Tiffen 1995, p. 42).  Between
1932 and 1989, there was a fivefold increase in the district's population; average density
rose from 18/km2 in 1932 to 106/km2 in 1989.  By 1990, all pasture land was privately
owned and degraded; communal grazing lands were converted to arable land and terraced
and trees were planted to shelter houses, to demarcate boundaries and to produce timber17
and fuel.  "Photographs taken in 1937 and 1990 attest to the transformation of eroded,
unproductive land into a manicured farm landscape" (Tiffen 1995).
However, while population growth almost certainly affects land use, population
growth is only one of many factors that do so.  Domestic and world markets for
agricultural products also influence land use patterns, as do ecological and technological
changes, land tenure systems, capital markets, government regulations, and tax policies.
It is often the interaction of population growth with these factors, especially insecure land
tenure, poor soil quality and vulnerable ecology that results in land degradation.  In much
of Africa, it is land held in common and without rules governing access, that is most
adversely impacted by population growth.  Yet Mortimore (1993) shows that even under
such conditions, farmers in northern Nigeria adapted well to the doubling of their
population.  In the general case, however, clearly defined property rights and efficient
labor and capital markets are key to translating expanding markets for agricultural
products (whether driven by population growth or trade expansion) into incentives and
measures for land improvement and soil conservation, that allows production growth
without land degradation (Larson and Bromley 1990, Migot-Adholla et al 1993, and Jolly
and Torrey 1993).18
Figure 2. Agricultural Land and Population (Average Annual Change: 1961-87)
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Average Annual Change in Population (%)
Source: Mink, S.D. (1993), “Poverty, Population, and the Environment,” World Bank
































































Much remains to be learned about the dynamic relationship between population
growth and land use.  Neither the research on resource limits nor studies that rely on
cross-sectional data can capture the dynamics between population growth and land use
change.  Long-time series at the appropriate time and space scales are limited, and most
time series analyses have established correlations rather than causality.  For causality, it
would be necessary to have both a more explicit theory of how population growth
induces land use change, and to empirically control for all other factors that affect land
use.  Adequate attention needs to be paid to interactions (multiplicative rather than
additive effects), time lags, and technical issues of endogeneity.  For example, if land use
change has significant income effects, it might result in changes in population growth
rates, through changes in migration or fertility rates.  Also better measures of land use
change are needed, as well as more carefully constructed time series on land use
variables.  In recent years, remote sensing and geographic information systems (GIS)
have dramatically improved our ability to monitor and quantify land use changes and
construct appropriate time series for dynamic analysis of the relationship between
population growth and land use.
While all land use changes constitute changes of the environment of the
landscapes in which they take place, many such changes constitute welfare improvement
as new uses produce a greater economic value than the ones they replace.  From an
anthropocentric point of view, land use change constitutes a welfare-reducing
environmental change when (a) inferior land uses replace superior ones as it is likely to
happen under conditions of open access e.g. tropical forests; (b) there are significant off-
site externalities such as sedimentation of water bodies due to soil erosion or water
contamination due to excessive or inappropriate use of agrochemicals; (c) land use
change involves the loss of environmental services that are not accounted for, such as
watershed protection, wildlife habitat or the increased vulnerability to natural disasters
such as pest outbreaks, floods etc.; (d) future consequences of current land use change are
discounted more heavily by private markets than it is socially optimal, such as the loss of
biodiversity and the release of greenhouse gasses resulting from land use change or the
emergence of more virulent strains of pests resulting from the increased use of chemical20
pesticides; and (e) the social justification that led to land use change have disappeared but
land use cannot technically or economically be reversed (irreversibility).
It should be noted, however, that population growth, while a trigger of land use
change, is not the root cause of the resulting environmental consequences.  The root
cause is to be found in market failures that prevent the full costs of land use change to
register in the private economic calculus.  Under conditions of inefficient or distorted
markets any trigger (e.g. trade liberalization, technological change, increased export
demand) would result in land use changes with environmental implications that are social
welfare reducing.
Tracing out the contribution of human actions to environmental change arising
from land use change is further complicated by long lags, the effects of natural (non-
anthropogenic) processes and shocks, and the dynamism of landscape evolution.
According to Wolman (1993) “the sequence of changes following disturbance and the
duration of an apparently stable configuration are difficult to predict.  As these
disturbances interact with human activities, isolation of the significance of the one or the
other influence is particularly difficult” (p. 25).  Two other key concepts on which little
information is available are the resilience (rebound) and recovery (reversal) of ecological
systems following a change, whether anthropogenic or natural.   While it is easy to
establish the lack of resilience and recovery, and hence the irreversibility of erosion and
soil loss on steep slopes as a result of farming without terracing, it is difficult to ascertain
more subtle ecological changes brought about by land use change and to assess the
likelihood of reversal.
To sum up, the historical record indicates that human population has significantly
altered the natural landscape over much of the globe.  Furthermore, there is evidence that
land use change and demographic changes are correlated, but causality is more difficult
to establish conclusively.  The environmental consequences of past land use change (to
the extent that they can be ascertained) have been significant but have not thus far
diminished the capacity of land, aided by technology, to produce food at a rate faster than
population growth, contrary to Malthusian and neo-Malthusian predictions.  Sub-Saharan
Africa has been the one region of the world where food production has not kept pace with
population growth.  The reasons are many and complex, including geography, history,21
economic policy, civil wars, but also characteristically environmental degradation and
low levels of agricultural technology.  However, even for the regions of the world that
have fared well in the past, past experience cannot easily be extrapolated into the future
for several reasons.  First, the environmental consequences of past land use changes, such
as possible climate change, may not have fully unfolded.  Second, while population
growth is slowing down, the magnitudes involved in absolute numbers of people are
unprecedented in history: despite dropping fertility rates, a billion people were added to
world population from 1987 to 1999--an increase equal to the total world population in
1804 (UN 1999).  According to Wolman (1990), “Today the human capacity to alter the
environment is on a scale equivalent to the forces of nature, a situation that did not
prevail in the past.”
3.2 Population and Water Use
With over a billion people lacking access to clean water today, further population
growth at the low UN population projection, would put additional pressure on accessible
water resources and reduce the per capita availability of clean water and increase the
numbers of those without access.  This is particularly so because 90 percent of the
projected population increase is expected to take place in poor developing countries
where only two thirds of the population have access to clean water and the capital
resources for further water development and distribution are scarce.  Furthermore, in poor
countries, where half the population is lacking sanitation and sewage facilities, water
supplies are contaminated by disease-bearing human waste, as well as agricultural and
industrial pollution.  Use of polluted water spreads diseases and results in high mortality
and morbidity.  WRI (1995) reports that 1 billion people a year suffer from water-born
diseases.  Under these conditions population growth in these countries without significant
investments in water supply and sanitation would not only reduce per capita water
availability, it would also increase the contamination of existing water supplies and raise
the cost of providing even the current level of access and quality.  As surface waters
become increasingly polluted, people are turning to groundwater aquifers, some of which
are being drawn at rates faster than they can be replenished.  Population growth will22
accelerate the depletion of aquifers both because of increased demand for water and
because of further contamination of surface waters.
Additional quantities of water are also needed for crop irrigation and livestock to
produce the additional food needed to supply a growing population.  According to
Falkenmark (1992), “A desired yield increase from 1 ton/ha to 4 tons/ha might well
correspond with an increase in the return flow of water to the atmosphere from 1000
m
3/ha (100mm) to 4000 m
3/ha (400 mm) for a given crop.  The question then is whether
the desired amount of water is indeed available.” (p. 50).  Most of the poorest countries
where the largest increases in population are expected over the next 50 years (e.g. Africa
and South Asia) are located in agro-climatic zones where part of the year is dry or where
drought years are part of the climate.  These areas also experience high rates of
evaporation and low efficiency of rainfall and irrigation because of a dry and warm
atmosphere; as a result they have a short growing season and suffer recurrent droughts
imply a persistent crop failure risk.  Growing population in these regions results in
increasing withdrawals from surface sources with significant environmental
consequences for in-stream uses and ecological functions and/or in pumping of ground
water at unsustainable rates.
To the extent that population growth results in the clearing of forests, especially
tropical moist forests, that serve as water catching areas, the hydrological cycle may be
disrupted, rainfall diminished, usable water supply reduced, and destructive flash-floods
increased.  For example, Salati (1985) estimates that about 75% of the annual rainfall in
the Amazon Basin is returned from the forest to the atmosphere; the loss of forest could
reduce future rainfall.  Mebar Homji (1985), based on a vegetation-rainfall study
covering 29 stations for over 100 years, found that the number of indicators showing
decreasing rainfall was association with the size of the area of deforestation.  Somanathan
(1991) attributes the increase of flooding in the Indian state of Uhar Pradesh, from 17,000
sq. km. in 1953-65 to 41,000 sq.km in 1976-78, to deforestation in the Himalayas.  Vohra
(1987) finds a strong correlation between upstream soil erosion and downstream
flooding.  Thus, land degradation, whether induced by population growth or not, may
exacerbate water scarcity and other water-related problems, making it more difficult to
meet the water needs of a growing population.23
Not all water shortages are due to genuine physical scarcity of water.  Indeed,
countries with plentiful rainfall and surface water bodies such as Thailand, Indonesia and
parts of China and India face severe and growing water shortages and inter-sectoral
water-use conflicts.  The cause of these problems is not population growth but
mismanagement and wasteful use.  In much of the developing world, free or heavily
subsidized irrigation water destroys market signals, encouraging farmers to use water
beyond its economic and agronomic optimum.  Under-priced water stifles incentives to
invest in maintaining and improving water systems, which are often plagued by poor
drainage and inefficient distribution.  For example, revenues from irrigation water
charges in Bangladesh and Thailand cover only 10-20 percent of total costs of supplying
water to farms (Rogers 1985).
Cheap water often becomes a substitute for other inputs, such as land
improvement and soil conservation; over-irrigation, in turn, leads to water-logging,
salinization and alkalization of soil.  The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
estimates that fifty percent of all irrigated lands have been damaged by over-irrigation,
which results in both on-site economic losses in terms of reduced fertility of irrigated
areas and off-site environmental damages in terms of increased salt loading of return flow
and aquifers.  Furthermore, the irrigable area is reduced by water use inefficiencies.  For
example, it is estimated that a 10 percent improvement of irrigation system efficiency in
Panama could save enough water to irrigate another two million hectares (WRI 1987).
However, as long as farmers do not bear the true cost of water, they are unlikely to
appreciate its scarcity or recognize the problems that arise from overuse.  Until they
receive clear market signals indicating otherwise, they will continue to use water
wastefully.  Where water is so wasted, there would be less room to accommodate more
people, and any population growth would result in amplified water resource needs and
magnified environmental consequences.  While the correction of these market and policy
failures is the first-best solution, when there are multiple distortions but only some (not
all) can be corrected; we are in a second-best world, and direct control of population
growth may be the best feasible possible policy alternative for dealing with the problem.24
3.3 Population and Pollution
Other things equal, a growth of population results in growth of air and water
pollution and solid waste.  Some pollutants rise in direct proportion to population growth
and others more slowly.  The association between population growth and pollutant load is
exemplified by New York City, where the population grew from 3 million in 1880 to
14.2 million in 1980.  Waterborne discharges of organic carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus
from human waste rose in direct proportion to population.  Yet other developments, such
as industrialization, large-scale agriculture development, and introduction of new
products both complicate the picture and overshadow the effects of population growth.
For example, phosphate-based detergents, introduced in the 1950s, were contributing by
1980 substantially more phosphorus to the New York region’s surface water than human
waste (Tarr and Ayres 1990).
Cole et al. (1993), in a study of 42 rivers found a close correlation between the
level of marine pollution from nitrates and the level of population in the watershed and
predicted a 55 percent increase in nitrate levels as a result of doubling population.  While
correlation does not imply causation, these results are fully consistent with the hypothesis
that in the absence of effective mechanisms of internalization of externalities, population
growth leads to increased waste generation.  Given the absence of effective mechanisms
to internalize the environmental costs of fertilizer use, sewage discharge and watershed
disturbance and the direct and indirect subsidization of those activities, in many
instances, it is not surprising that the larger the population, the larger the nitrate pollution.
Yet the level of development, the structure of the economy and the strictness of
environmental regulations do play a role (see below).
Further evidence of the population-pollution connection is provided by Mink
(1993) who found that the growth in the use of nitrogen parallels worldwide population
growth, although there are significant variations by country depending on land
availability and quality, dietary habits and level of development.  Since as much as 50
percent of applied nitrogen ends up in freshwater bodies and the sea, the author projects
proportional increase in related water pollution problem with projected population growth
into the foreseeable future.  However, the fact that 50 percent of applied nitrogen leaches
into water bodies and application efficiency is very low, suggests that there is enormous25
scope for increased efficiency and reduced application and related pollution problems.
With full-cost pricing, proper application and related land use management, the growth of
agricultural production, whether population driven or not, can be de-coupled from
increased fertilizer use, which in turn can be de-coupled from increased nitrogen leaching
and loading on water systems.  This indeed happened in Japan, where application of
nitrogen between 1960 and 1980 were reduced by 10 percent while agricultural
production increased significantly (Smil 1991), and where ground water has not been
affected by one of the world’s highest fertilization rates, due to improved efficiency in
fertilizer application and land-use management..
3.4 Population and Deforestation
The relationship between expanding human populations and receding forests,
especially in the tropics, has received considerable attention, since forests play a key role
in water and soil conservation, wildlife habitat, biodiversity protection and the carbon
cycle, as well as being a source of raw material for the timber industry and livelihood for
local communities.  Each year, 70 million people are added to world population, mostly
in developing countries and 15 million square kilometers of forests disappear.  This led
many people to postulate a simple displacement-model of “more people, fewer forests”
(Allen and Barnes 1985, Myers 1987, Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990, and Rudel 1991), but
deforestation is a complex and dynamic process in which the role of population growth is
neither static nor monotonic.  In what follows, we critically review selected studies of the
empirical relationship between population growth and deforestation and conclude that
much more empirical research, with more sophisticated models, is necessary before we
can fully understand the role of population dynamics (density, growth, distribution and
composition) on deforestation in different socioeconomic contexts.
Southgate (1994) analyzed data from 24 Latin American countries to determine
the causes of agricultural frontier expansion and hence of forest clearance.  He found that
the expansion of the agricultural frontier was positively correlated with both population
growth and agricultural export growth and negatively related to the growth of agricultural
yields.  Cropper and Griffith (1994) used panel data for Asia, Africa and Latin America
over the period 1961-88 to determine the causes of deforestation.  The authors find an26
inverted u-relationship between deforestation and income and a positive relationship
between deforestation and population growth and rural population density, but the latter
relationship is not highly significant.  Barbier (1996) analyzed pooled cross-section and
time series for 21 countries in Latin America over the period 1980-85 to identify the key
influences on forest clearance.  He found that rural population density, along with
roundwood production and agricultural yields, explained about half the variation in
deforestation.  However, the population elasticity of deforestation was relatively small: a
ten percent increase in rural population density was found to result in a 0.36 percent
increase in the annual forest area cleared.  A proportionate (10%) increase in agricultural
yields (reflecting largely technological change) results in three times as high reduction in
deforestation (1.16%), suggesting that a plausible increase in yields can offset the effect
of population growth on forest clearance.  However, rising yields might not slow down
deforestation if poor households are cultivating marginal lands that experience
degradation and yield decline.  Indeed, the positive relationship between rural population
density and deforestation probably reflects the forest encroachment activities of migrating
poor rural households in much of Latin America.
In a similar study of the causes of deforestation in Thailand’s poorest region, the
Northeast, during the period 1973-82, Panayotou and Sungsuwan (1992) found that
population density was the most important factor leading to deforestation; other factors
were poverty, wood price and agricultural yields.  The dominance of population growth
as a cause of deforestation should be expected in Thailand’s poorest and most populous
region.  Both population density and population growth are relatively high, soil fertility is
poor, most agricultural land is insecurely held, and non-farm activities are scarce.  Forest
encroachment for conversion to agriculture and progressive shortening of the fallow
cycle from 10-15 years down to 4-6 years are two channels through which increasing
population density leads to deforestation and reduced forest regeneration.  Two other
factors, artificially high fertilizer and kerosene prices, further exacerbated the effect of
high population density on deforestation by acting as “taxes” on agricultural
intensification and fuel substitution, respectively.  A second study, Tongpan and
Panayotou (1990), that extended the study period to 1988, found similar results: a ten27
percent increase in the rate of population growth was associated with a 3.3 percent
increase in deforestation.
While it is tempting to conclude that at least in the case of Northeast Thailand,
“population drives deforestation,” the context must be kept in mind: open access forest
resources, insecurely held agricultural land, lack of access to credit, scarcity of off-farm
employment opportunities and low levels of education, all combine to prevent people
from responding to growing population density, according to what Boserup (1981) would
have expected.  A more complete analysis should incorporate these factors and their
interaction with population growth.  This is illustrated by the results of a study of forty
tropical countries (Panayotou 1993), which found that it is the strong interaction between
population density and income per capita that determines deforestation rather than simply
population density, suggesting that population density affects the environment differently
at different stages of economic development.  Indeed, a rerun of the models with the
addition of 27 developed countries reduced substantially both the magnitude and the
significance of the extent to which population density accounts for deforestation.
Table 2 below summarizes the results of selected deforestation studies that
examined the role of population density and growth in deforestation.  Most, but not all,
find a positive relationship, some stronger than others.  Westoby (1968) and Palo et al.
(1987), however, found zero correlation, while Burgess (1991, 1992) found a negative
relationship between population growth and deforestation.  Inevitably, all these studies
have their limitations.  Palo et al., using a systems approach, argued that population as a
causal factor of deforestation has to be analyzed within the relevant socioeconomic
context, a point made earlier in relation to Northeast Thailand.29
Table 2. Summary of Selected Deforestation Studies
Study Unit of Analysis Dependent
variables
Independent variables Methodology sample size
1. Lugo, Schmidt & Brown
(1981)




C.S., Linear Regression 30
2. Allen & Barnes (1985) Nation (global) Deforestation rate
( D.R.)
+ pop increase, + increase in farmland, +wood-use, -
0.05 wood export in 1968
C.S., Linear Regression 39
Units from Africa, Asia and L.A.
3. Grainger (1986) Nation (global) D.R. +pop increase, +area logged C.S., Linear Regression 43
4. Palo, Salami and Geradol
(1987)
Nation (global) %FC -pop density C.S. Linear Regression 60
5. Rudel (1989) Nation (global) D.R. +pop increase, +availability of capital C.S. Linear Regression 36
6. Panayotou and Sungsuwan
(1992)
Province (Nation) %FC -pop density, wood price C.S. Linear Regression, 64
7. Scotti (1990) Nation (global) %FC -pop density C.S. Linear Regression, 47
8. Reis and Margulis (1990) Municipality
(Brazil)
%Deforestation +pop density, +road density, +crop area C.S. Linear Regression, 474
9. Burgess (1991) Nation (global) Level of
deforestation
+pop growth, +GDP per capita, +debt service ratio as %
of exports, +total roundwood production, food
production per capita
C.S. Linear Regression, 44
10. Burgess (1992) Nation (global) Change in closed
forest area
-pop density, real GNP per capita in 1980, -roundwood
production per capita
C.S. Linear Regression, 44
11. Kahn and McDonald (1994) Nation (global) Deforested area -pop, +forested land area, +annual change in public
external debt
C.S., 2 Stage Linear Regression
model, 54
12. Capistrano (1994) Nation (global) Depletion of
broadleaf forests
+pop, +GNP per capita, -debt service ratio C.S. Linear Regression, 45
13. Kummer and Sham (1994) Province
(Philippines)
Area deforested -population, -road density C.S. Linear Regression, 68
14. Chakraborty (1994) Nation (India) Reserved forest area -livestock unit, -per capita income, -net rate return, -
fuelwood and charcoal production
T.S., Linear Regression
Notes: C.S. = Cross section, T.S. = Time series, Nation (global) means unit of analysis is a nation, while the sample intends to cover deforestation on global scale.
Source: Saxena, A.K. and J.C. Nautiyal (1997).  "Analyzing Deforestation: A Systems Dynamic Approach," Journal of Sustainable
Forestry, Vol. 5, No. 3/4.30
Kummer and Sham (1994) criticized earlier studies for failing to distinguish
between the determinants of forest cover and deforestation, and to include initial
conditions in the analysis.  Other limitations pertaining to most of these studies is the use
of static and linear specifications to analyze what is intrinsically a dynamic problem,
involving non-linear interaction between factors and dynamic feedbacks.  Saxena and
Nautiyal use a systems approach to construct a dynamic model of deforestation.  They
find that both the number of people and their socioeconomic conditions have a significant
impact on deforestation and conclude that “population has to be considered as a causal
factor only in context of other factors and … that the role of the interactions among the
factors of the system is crucial in driving the deforestation process” (p. 34).
3.5 Population and Climate Change
According to an expert panel convened by the National Academy of Sciences to
consider the implications of climate change in 1992, “The more people there are in the
world, the greater is the demand put on resources to provide food, energy, clothing and
shelter for them.  All these activities necessarily involve emissions of greenhouse gases”
(NAS 1992).  Newell and Marcus found a 99.8 percent correlation between world
population growth and growing concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere during
the period 1958-83 and called it the “nearly perfect” correlation.
 Figure 3 depicts a very close association between CO2 emissions and population
during the past 130 years.  However, even a nearly perfect correlation does not imply
causation.  Otherwise, we would expect countries with large population such as China
and India to have the highest greenhouse gas emissions, yet the US, with only 4% of the
world’s population, accounts for 23% of the world’s total greenhouse gas emissions.
Clearly, per capita resource consumption, which is a function of per capita
income, is another major determinant of greenhouse gas emissions, but there is little
agreement among analysts as to the relative importance of population growth and
economic growth.  Moreover, many other factors, such as climate, geographic location
vis a vis the coast, socioeconomic systems, energy prices, degree of urbanization,31
domestic energy endowments and many other factors influence a country’s level of CO2
emissions.
To apportion the contribution of population growth to greenhouse gas emissions,
Holdren (1991) used a simple mathematical formula:
I = P x A x T
where  I = environmental impact, in this case CO2 emissions
P = population
A = affluence or per capita consumption level (consumption/population)
T = per capita pollution produced by the technology use in that consumption
(emissions/consumption)
Holdren calculated that over the past two centuries, population growth was responsible
for 40 percent of the increase in energy consumption, including traditional fuels.
Harisson (1994), using the same methodology, attributed 36 percent of the annual
emissions growth between 1965 and 1989 to population growth and 64 percent to per
capita consumption of energy, while technology helped offset part of the emissions
growth.
Birdsall (1992) analyzed the relative costs of mitigating CO2 emissions by various
means including carbon taxes to reduce fossil fuel consumption in developed countries.
She concluded that developed countries can more cost-effectively reduce global CO2
emissions by helping developing countries reduce their population growth through
“family planning and girls’ education.”
Lutz (1993), on the other hand, taking into account regional differences in
population growth, energy consumption and deforestation found a smaller role for
population growth in the total growth of industrial CO2 emissions and a larger role for
population growth for CO2 and methane emissions from land use changes.  Others have
argued that, regardless of the relative role of population growth in the growth of
greenhouse gas emissions, any policy to slow down climate change must focus on
consumption patterns rather than population control, because the “demographics
dynamics are subject to greater inertial forces than consumption and production patterns”
(Rahman et al 1993).32
Figure 3. World Population and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 1860-1990
Source:  Population Action International, “Considering Population’s Role,”
http://www.cnie.org/pop/CO2/consider.htm.33
The I = PAT equation approach to climate change analysis is subject to many
limitations, pointed out by Lutz (1992,1993), Engelman (1998) and others.  First, since
the trends of population and consumption varied widely over time, the results are very
sensitive to the selection of the starting and ending dates of analysis.  Second, the right-
hand side variables (population, consumption and technology) interact in complex ways
that are not captured by the equation.  More importantly, the equation lacks behavioral
context and is prone to inappropriate aggregation of diverse behaviors.  Projections
forward ignore underlying structural changes and compound the uncertainty inherent in
the three multiplicative factors.
Bongaarts (1992) made an effort to take into account the structure of the economy
and the energy mix; in addition to population size and income per capita, he also included
carbon emitted from net deforestation (net of carbon sequestration by growing forests):
T = P x G x E x C + D
where T = total annual carbon emissions
P = population size
G = GDP per capita
E = energy intensity of GDP (per unit of GDP)
C = carbon intensity of energy use (per unit of energy)
D = carbon emitted from deforestation
Based on projected world population growth from 4.8 billion in 1985 to 10.5
billion by the year 2000, GDP per capita growth from $3,000 to $36,000, energy intensity
decline by 50%, global carbon intensity constant and a decline in carbon emissions due to
deforestation from 12% to 3% by the year 2100, he projected a 7-fold increase in total
CO2 for developing countries and a 3-fold increase for developed countries.  The relative
contributions of the different factors are shown in Figure 4.  Population growth, which
accounts for about a third of the overall global increase in emissions between 1985 and
2100, is far more important in developing countries, where it is projected to contribute34
53% of CO2 emissions, while in developed countries its contribution is only 16%.  In
terms of policy, the author includes population control as part of a policy package to
control climate change but he also recognizes the “demographic inertia” and emphasizes
the rapid transfer of low-carbon technologies from developed to developing countries.
Econometric studies aiming to explain variations in CO2 emissions over time and
across countries have generally assumed that CO2 emissions are proportional to
population and have sought to understand the relationship between emissions per capita
and GDP per capita, while controlling for country and time fixed effects (Schmalensee,
Stoker and Judson 1998, Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995, Galeotti and Lanza 1999 and
Panayotou, Sachs and Peterson 1999).  These studies have found an inverted U-shaped
relationship between CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita (usually in purchasing
power parity terms), and use the coefficients so obtained to forecast total emissions by
projecting GDP growth and using the UN population projections.  We know of no studies
that have attempted to estimate the population elasticity of CO2 emissions, but some
preliminary estimates by this author suggest that this elasticity may differ between
developed and developing countries (1.0 versus 1.3).  This might be due to population-
induced structural changes in energy use or urbanization that more than offset any scale
economies, or may be just simply due to left-out variables.  This is an area that warrants
further research.35
Figure 4.  Determinants of growth of CO2 emission from fossil fuels
Source: Tonalee Carlson Key, “The Effect of Population on Global Climate Change,”
http://www.cnie.org/pop/intros/globalclimate2.htm.
McEvedy C. and R. Jones (199) Atlas of the world population history; UN Secretariat,
World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision; Census Bureau. Figure obtained from
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/99/01/25/6302058chart1.htm36
4. New Macro Perspectives and the Environmental Kuznets Curve
The 1990s have seen the advent of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)
hypothesis and an explosion of studies that tested it for a variety of pollutants.  The EKC
hypothesis postulates that environmental quality deteriorates with income growth in
earlier stages of development, reaches its lowest point at an intermediate level of per
capita income and improves at higher income levels.  Expressed as a relationship between
environmental degradation or emissions (SO2, PM, CO2, etc.) and income per capita is
also known as the inverted U-shaped environmental-income relationship.  The reasons
behind this non-monotonic relationship have to do with structural changes in the
economy (from agriculture, to industry, to services) along the course of economic
development.    Furthermore, economic growth brings along two opposing forces: a
larger scale of economic activity that increases pollution levels, and growth in incomes
that raises the demand for environmental quality and the willingness to pay to bring it
about.  Population growth and/or population density is included in some of the studies
that aim to test the environment-income relationship, either as a control variable or in
order to examine its interaction with income in influencing emission or environmental
quality.    We will first review the main EKC studies and then examine more closely
those that include population variables.
Grossman and Krueger (1994) estimated EKCs for SO2, dark matter (smoke) and
suspended particles using GEMS (Global Environmental Monitoring System) data for 52
cities in 32 countries during the period 1977-88, and in per capita GDP data in purchasing
power parity (PPP) terms.  For SO2 and dark matter, they found turning points at $4000-
$5000 per capita; suspended particles continually declined at even low-income levels.
However, at income levels over $10,000-$15,000 all three pollutants began to increase
again, a finding which may be an artifact of the cubic equation used in the estimation and
the limited number of observations at high-income levels.
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) estimated EKCs for 10 different indicators for
environmental degradation, including lack of clean water and sanitation, deforestation,
municipal waste, and sulfur oxides and carbon emissions.  Their sample includes
observations for up to 149 countries during 1960-90 and their functional specification
log-linear, log-quadratic and logarithmic cubic polynomial functional forms.  They found37
that lack of clean water and sanitation declined uniformly with increasing incomes and
over time; water pollution, municipal waste and carbon emissions increase; and
deforestation is independent of income levels. In contrast, air pollutants conform to the
EKC hypothesis with turning points at income levels between $300 and $4000.  Selden
and Song (1994) also found that three air pollutants, SO2, NOx and SPM conform with
the EKC hypothesis, with turning points at income levels in the range of $8,700 to
$11,200 per capita (in PPP terms).  Panayotou (1993), using cross section data and a
translog specification, found similar results for these pollutants, with turning points at
income levels ranging from $3000 to $5000.  (The lower figures are due to the use of
official exchange rates rather than PPP rates).  Panayotou also found that deforestation
also conforms to the EKC hypothesis, with a turning point around $800 per capita.
Cropper and Griffiths (1994), on the other hand, using panel data, obtained a turning
point for deforestation in Africa and Latin America between $4700 and $5400 (in PPP
terms).  Finally, Cole et. al. (1997) have examined the existence of EKC for a wide range
of environmental indicators and concluded that “meaningful EKCs exist only for local air
pollutants, whilst indicators with a more global, more indirect, environmental impact
either increase with income or else have high turning points with large standard errors.”
EKC studies attempt to control for other influences on environmental quality,
either by direct inclusion of other variables in the reduced-form equation or by employing
country (or country and time) fixed-effect estimators.  Here, we will briefly review the
role played by the population variable in influencing environmental quality along the path
of economic development in selected EKC studies.  Panayotou (1993) found that higher
population density delays the turning point at which further income growth slows down
deforestation, while Panayotou (1997) found that population density raises the height of
the EKC for SO2 at every level of income.  In the latter study, the relationship between
population density and SO2 emissions was found to be highly non-linear, with higher
impacts at low and high densities.
Vincent (1997), in a study that tested and rejected the EKC for total suspended
particulates (TSP) in a single country (Malaysia), found that the net impact of population
density on TSP concentration was positive, which he attributed to the fact that
“household activities like cooking and heating, rubbish disposal and transportation are38
important sources of particulate concentrations” (p.425).  Vincent also found a negative
interaction term between population density and time, indicating a downward pressure on
population-driven TSP concentrations by the mere passage of time, which he attributes to
increasingly effective anti-pollution regulations.  The same study found analogous results
for water quality: holding income constant, higher population densities were associated
with worse water quality as measured by biological oxygen demand (BOD), and
ammoniacal nitrogen (which reflect the growth of sewage discharge) and better quality as
measured by suspended solids (which probably reflects the movement of people out of
rural areas).  The interaction between population density and time was again negative for
the first two pollutants, reflecting more effective regulations over time pertaining to BOD
discharges by palm-oil mills and reduction of the percentage of population without access
to sanitary facilities.
Selden and Song (1994) have also tested the relationship between population
density and airborne emissions while holding income constant.  They found a negative
relationship, which they attribute to the likelihood that in countries with low population
densities, there will be less pressure to adopt stringent environmental standards;
moreover, emissions due to transportation are likely to be higher.  Their econometric
results suggest that an additional resident per hectare would lower per capita SO2 by 12-
15 kgs, SPM by 3-5 kgs and CO by 10.3-16.2 kgs (per person).  This density effect tends
to partially affect the scale effect of population growth.  Indeed, with the exception of
SPM, their models with population density forecast global emissions to peak and turn
down earlier and at significantly lower levels than models without population density.
For example, SO2 emissions (in the fixed-effects baseline) are projected to peak by the
year 2046 at 144% above 1986 levels, when growing population density is considered,
rather than in the year 2085 at 354% above 1986 levels, when population density is not
considered.  Population density, however, changes along the course of socioeconomic
development.  As Stern et al. (1996) pointed out, societies tend to go through a process of
increasing and then falling urban population densities as they develop.”  This trend may
result in redistribution of pollution with ambient concentrations falling, even while
emissions may continue to rise.39
A word of caution is in order.  Most EKC studies analyze cross-sectional data to
obtain results that are interpreted as if they are obtained from a time-series analysis; that
is, as if they revealed what happens to the environment as income is increased in a
representative country.  This involves a certain leap of faith that dictates caution in the
use of these results.
5. New Micro Perspectives of Population Growth, Poverty, and Environmental
Degradation
The new micro perspective focuses on people in rural communities in the poorest
regions of the world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian sub-continent, and
identifies situations in which population growth, poverty and environmental degradation
are entangled in a mutually reinforcing vicious circle.  It begins with the “new economic
demography,” which regards population growth as endogenous and seeks to identify the
determinants of fertility behavior by focusing on the decisions made by individual
households and their motivations.  In contrast to those that argued that the high fertility in
the world’s poorest regions is the consequence of an unmet need for modern birth-control
devices (e.g. Robey, Rutstein and Morris 1993), the new economic demography
postulates that parental demand for children can best explain reproductive behavior
(Schultz, 1993).  However, this new approach, which has its roots in the seminal
contribution by (Baker 1960) has been criticized as incomplete by Easterlin (1975, 1978),
Easterlin et al (1980) and Dasgupta (1995).  According to Easterlin and Easterlin et al,
reproductive behavior depends not only on the demand for children but also on potential
family size and the costs of fertility regulation.  Potential family size is considered a
function of demographic as well as socioeconomic factors.  Fertility control depends on
the excess of potential family size over desired family size and on the costs of fertility
regulation.  While this approach gives a more complete description of actual fertility
behavior than the demand for children alone favored by the new economic demography,
its empirical testing is constrained by the lack of adequate data.  Perhaps more central to
our subject matter, the population-environment nexus, is the critique by Dasgupta (1995).
First, he argues that the new economic demography treats the household as a monolithic
unit, having a unitary view of wellbeing and making choices to maximize its welfare,40
while there is ample evidence of gender iniquities within rural poor household affecting
the allocation of education, food, healthcare and other household resources.  Second, the
new household economics, which lies at the heart of the new approach, ignores the
possibility that the individual optimizing decisions of a large number of households may
result in collective failure, since the private benefits and costs of having children may
differ significantly from their social benefits and costs.
The demand for children is determined by the benefits and costs of having
children.  However, if not all the costs and benefits of decisions are borne by the
decision-maker, the decision may not be optimal.  With regard to gender inequality
within poor households, women bear a disproportionate share of the cost of having
children (pregnancy, breast-feeding, daily care and risk of maternal mortality); yet in
many traditional societies men are the decision-makers with regard to the desired number
of children.  These inequalities, reinforced and perpetuated by high rates of female
illiteracy and low share of paid employment, lead to the similarity of women’s professed
demand for children to that of men's, despite substantial differences in the respective
reproductive costs (Mason and Taj 1987).  Dasgupta (1995), after surveying the evidence,
concludes that “differences between the genders in the net benefits of having children are
a key ingredient in the population problem facing both the Indian subcontinent and the
Sub-Saharan Africa" (p. 1891).
Further evidence of the dependence of population growth on the net demand for
children (rather than the available family planning services) was provided by Pritchett
(1994) who regressed actual fertility on fertility desired, based on a sample of 43
countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America.  Differences in desired fertility explained
90% of cross-country variations in total fertility rates.
Gender inequalities aside, what are the determinants of the demand for children
and how does this demand affect the local natural resource base of the household and the
community? Dasgupta (1995) proposed two hypotheses: children as ends and children as
productive assets.  The motive for having children as ends in themselves arises from the
positive value that parents assign to children, e.g. reproducing the lineage, deriving direct
utility, and obeying social or religious norms.  Originally, such norms prescribing high
fertility had a social purpose, when population densities were low and mortality was high.41
Inertia, low educational level and imitative behavior may perpetuate high fertility rates
even when mortality rates have dropped and the original rationale for the social norm has
disappeared (Dasgupta 1993).
The motive for having children as productive assets has at least two dimensions.
First is old age security in circumstances where old-age pension and social security are
absent.  Second, but equally important, is the role that children play in poor countries as
income-earning assets.  In much of rural South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa and other
poor areas of the developing world, households derive a good part of their livelihood
from common property resources.  Households do not have access to domestic energy
and tap water.  Fuelwood must be obtained from receding forests and water from distant
and often dwindling water sources.
A variety of foods and other non-timber forest products, fish and fodder for
livestock are also obtained from commonly-held resources.  These activities are time
consuming and require much labor.  With little or no capital available and with receding
natural resources, labor productivity is low, competition is strong and increasing effort is
called for on a daily basis to ensure survival.  Children are the main source of this labor.
Once they are old enough (usually over 5) children would tend domestic animals, look
after younger siblings, fetch water, fuelwood and fodder, help with land clearing and
collect a variety of naturally occurring products (e.g. herbs, mushrooms, and medicinal
plants) essential to the household’s sustenance.  According to the Centre for Science and
Environment (1990), children between the ages of 10 and 15 work 50 percent more hours
than adults in these activities, more than defraying the costs of their upkeep by the time
they are 12 (Cain 1987).  This role of children as productive assets has two critical
implications.  First, appropriation by capture makes the number of children the decisive
instrument in the hands of the household: the household’s share of open-access resources
depends on the number of hands it employs to convert common property into private
property.  This is not unlike the case of common pasture, where each household’s share
depends on the number of animals it grazes.  The rule of capture puts a premium on the
deployment of as large a number of human hands (and animal mouths) as possible, to
appropriate open-access resources before others do.  In this context, children are a
primary vehicle of resource capture and a major asset rather than a liability for the42
household.  On the one hand, the availability of unappropriated resources open to capture
raises the benefits of having children; on the other hand, the strong kinship support
system of many traditional societies spreads the costs of raising children beyond the
decision-making household, further increasing the net benefits from having them and
raising the demand for larger families (Dasgupta 1995, Panayotou 1995).
The second implication of children as income-earning assets has to do with the
social consequences of this household welfare maximizing demand for children.  While
having a large number of children exploiting the commons is optimal from the individual
household’s perspective given the open access regime, socially it is not optimal, and in
the long run it is devastating for the resource, the community and eventually the
individual household.  Entry into common-access resources continues until excessive
capture costs and damage to the resource dissipate all rents.  In the approach toward this
lower-level equilibrium, households may in fact respond by adding more hands to offset
the declining labor productivity (Panayotou 1995, 1996).  But since everyone is doing the
same without consideration of the effects of one’s increased effort on the average return
of effort and the sustainability of the resource, degradation accelerates and people are
trapped in rising poverty.  This is not to imply that commonly-held resources were
always a source of destructive competition; traditionally communities relied on social
norms to protect their commons from over-exploitation, but economic and social change-
-including interference from the outside--have eroded traditional controls (see Ostrom
1991).  Under these conditions, fertility, poverty and environmental degradation reinforce
each other in a positive feedback that creates a vicious circle of growing population and
deteriorating social and environmental conditions (Dasgupta 1995).  Indeed, Cleaver and
Schreiber (1992) found evidence of this happening in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
poverty, fertility and environmental degradation are positively correlated.
It is tempting to conclude that having a large number of children (and hence
population growth) is the cause of over-population and degradation of resources.
However, there is clearly a question here of cause and effect.  The decision to have an
extra child is dependent on the expected benefits, a major part of which is the capture and
the appropriation of open-access resources for the household.  Hence, the availability of
unappropriated open-access resources as well as the advancing poverty as these resources43
become depleted may be thought of as causes of the demand for large families and hence
of high fertility rates.  However, even if we assume that population growth is not
endogenous, there are many ways in which a household can accommodate extra
members.  It can intensify agricultural production by investing in land improvement, soil
conservation, irrigation and other productivity-enhancing inputs (such as fertilizers), as
the Boserup (1965) expected would happen.  However, given the rural household’s
limited cash resources, such a response is predicated on the availability of and access to
credit.  But credit is often scarce due to interest rate ceilings, excessively costly due to
high cost of monitoring and information,
3 and unavailable to small rural borrowers with
inadequate collateral, especially when land is insecurely held.  Repetto (1986) reports that
lack of rural credit in Java has prevented upland farmers from undertaking investments
and adopting technologies with long payback periods, such as stump clearance, land
leveling, terracing, irrigation drainage and tree cropping.  Cleaver and Schreiber (1994)
report that government policies in Sub-Saharan Africa have kept food and fuelwood
prices low, thereby reducing the incentives for the intensification of food and wood
production.  Bilsborrow (1979) has summarized the multiphasic responses to resource
pressure and their determinants, as shown in Table 4.
To break the vicious circle of poverty, fertility and environmental degradation, a
number of policies need to be implemented concurrently.  Enhancement of education and
employment opportunities for women would raise the opportunity cost of having large
families as well as help break the “self-sustaining mode of behavior, characterized by
very high fertility and low education attainment” (Dasgupta 1995).  Providing affordable
fuel and potable water will reduce the need for extra hands.  Accessible family planning
services for those who demand them will also be helpful.  Finally, removing policy
distortions that prevent an efficient household and community response to population
growth and resource depletion is needed if population growth is to become a source of
innovation and economic growth.  The vicious circle may also be broken by policies that
reduce the credit constraint, e.g. by promoting micro-credit schemes or creating off-farm
employment opportunities.
                                                          
3 The high costs of rural credit may be also due to the high covariance in yield risk and in timing of
depositing and borrowing (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986).44
Table 4. Bilsborrow’s (1979) Multiphasic Responses to Resource Pressure
Type of Possible
Responses







Level of Agricultural Technology




Policy and Political Factors
Source: Bilsborrow, 1979, p. 5 and 1992, p. 131.45
6. Population-Environment Relationships: A Comparative Assessment of
Predictions, Approaches, and Methods
6.1 Perspectives and Predictions
Our review of the population-environment debate and analysis reveals a tremendous
variation in findings and their interpretation.  One source of the variation is undoubtedly
the different historical perspective or vantage point of the various writers.  Clearly,
Malthus (1798, 1803) did not foresee the technological advances of the last two hundred
years, because he formulated his theory before the industrial and agricultural revolutions.
Like classical writers and contemporaries, he assumed that land productivity was fixed.
He also assumed that population would continue to grow exponentially at a constant rate,
foreseeing neither the drop in mortality that attended the medical/public health
revolution, nor the decline in fertility and demographic transition attending economic
development.  Given his perspective and assumptions, his conclusions follow: an
exponentially growing population would eventually hit an absolute limit, the earth’s
capacity to produce food.
In contrast, Boserup (1965, 1976 and 1981), writing after both the agricultural and
industrial revolutions, not only makes technological change central to her thesis, but she
makes it endogenous and largely driven by population growth.  Under this formulation,
there is no possibility of famine, since technology advances in response to population
growth, allowing food production to keep pace with population growth.  The resource
limits are constantly moving out and the Malthusian “carrying capacity” is no longer
fixed but a moving target.  Under the Boserup hypothesis, the only way that a Malthusian
outcome can be obtained is by blocking all avenues of response or by assuming long
leads between population growth and technological response.  Indeed, the Neoclassical
formulation of the problem, that extended Boserup’s thesis to the industrial revolution,
focuses on the existence of policy distortions and market failures as barriers to efficient
response to emerging relative resource scarcities.  A Malthusian outcome can be obtained
from the neoclassical model if relative resource prices are prevented by market and/or
policy failures to reflect the relative resource scarcities.  In a dynamic formulation, a
lagged response to population-induced scarcities can lead to the same outcome, which46
neoclassical economists would likely attribute to institutional rigidities and the failure of
the public sector to internalize scientific and technological externalities.
It is more difficult to provide a “historical” explanation for the diametrically opposing
“findings” of neo-Malthusians and the “cornucopians;” they are largely contemporaries
analyzing the same body of evidence, yet they reach vastly different conclusions.  The
agricultural and industrial revolutions and the demographic trends attending both the
medical revolution and economic development are part of the historical records for both
schools of thought, but their interpretations differ.  The neo-Malthusians focus on
quantities; the cornucopians focus on prices.  The former see growing populations, rising
natural resource use and mounting pollution levels leading to eventual collapse; they see
only positive feedbacks.  The latter see advancing resource-saving technology (through
both efficiency improvement and substitution), falling relative resource prices and
improving living standards; they see only negative feedbacks.  The selective use of
evidence gives rise to outcomes that range from the most pessimistic to the most
optimistic.  The truth is somewhere in between.  The neo-Malthusians largely ignore
markets and underestimate the role of prices; the cornucopians ignore market failures and
underestimate the necessary investments in personal development to make a growing
population a positive resource.  To quote Dasgupta (1995):
In this background [of the vicious circle of population growth, poverty and
environmental degradation] it is hard to make sense of the oft-expressed
suggestion (e.g. Simon 1981) that there are cumulative benefits to be enjoyed
from increases in population size even in poor countries; that human beings are a
valuable resource.  To be sure, they are potentially valuable as doers of things and
originators of ideas, but for this they require the means of personal development.
Moreover, historical evidence on the way pressure of population led to changes in
the organization of production, property rights….does not seem to speak to the
population problem as it exists today in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian
subcontinent (p. 1898).
Yet barring Sub-Saharan Africa, neo-Malthusian predictions failed equally roundly.
Income per capita has grown in all other poor regions of the world; world food
production since 1960 grew annually by 0.6 percent faster than the world’s population47
and literacy improved substantially, even in societies where population grew much faster
than in the past.  As for resource scarcity, resource prices have been steadily declining,
signaling diminishing economic scarcity (Barnett and Morse 1963, Nordhaus 1974).  The
only exception has been tropical timber prices that grew at an annual rate of about 1
percent.  The situation with environmental quality is mixed: with regard to local and
regional pollutants, there has been a marked improvement in high- and middle-income
countries and continued deterioration in low-income and newly-industrialized countries.
With regard to global pollutants, CO2 and other greenhouse gases and the global
commons, especially biodiversity, there is continued deterioration.  But even here, there
seems to be an endogenous institutional response, albeit a slow and “tortuous” one, as
evidenced by the relative success of implementing the Montreal Protocol for controlling
ozone-depleting substances and negotiating the Kyoto Protocol for controlling
greenhouse gases.
6.2 Approaches and Methods of Analysis
4
A second source of variation among the studies analyzing the population and
environment relationship is the diversity of approaches and methods of analysis.  Some
are linear and static, others are non-linear and dynamic; some allow for feedbacks, others
do not; some are “bottom up” or micro, while others are “top down” or macro.  Marquette
and Bilsborrow (1997) identified the commonality and differences of the various
approaches and classified them into a few categories.  They identified five such groups of
approaches, summarized in Figure 5 and discussed briefly below:
                                                          
4 This section draws heavily on Marquette and Bilsborrow (1997).48
Figure 5.  Some Conceptual Approaches to Population and Environment
Relationships
(a) Linear perspectives
Malthus:   Population                                          Environment
Boserup: Population                                          Technology                                       Environment
(b) Multiplicative perspective
Environment Impacts = (Population size) {Affluence or per capita consumption) {Level of Technology)
(c) Mediating perspective
(d) Development-dependency perspective
(e) Complex systems perspective
Source:  Marquette and Bilshorrow (1997)








(a) The linear approach postulates a direct linear and reciprocal relationship
between population and the environment.  Malthus, Boserup and Simon, despite
their widely divergent historical and ideological perspectives, employ the same
linear approach.  They differ, however, in the factors they considered and the
feedbacks they allow for.  Malthus, having failed to anticipate technological
change, postulates a direct linear and reciprocal relationship (land use and food
production); population growth limits per capita food availability, which in turn
limits population through increased famine and mortality.  Neo-Malthusians
combined demographic and ecological trends along similar linear reciprocal
relationships to devise concepts such as the carrying capacity (e.g. Hardin 1968;
Ehrlich and Holdren 1971) and to construct mathematical and simulation models
(e.g. Meadows 1972, 1992 and Cohen 1995).
Boserup introduces a two-stage linear reciprocal relationship: the pressure of high
population density brought about by population growth induces technological
change (new inputs such as fertilizers, and new institutions such as property
rights), which allows food production from fixed land to keep pace with
population growth (hence no famine and no environmental degradation).  Simon,
like Boserup, introduces negative feedbacks between population and environment
via technology, but the operating concepts are human ingenuity and market
incentives, rather than the compulsion of necessity arising from population
pressure.
(b) The multiplicative approach obtains the environmental impacts as the
product of population size with the level of affluence or per capita consumption
and the level of technology in the form of the now-familiar I=PAT equation.  It is,
thus, the interaction of population with consumption and technology that
determines environmental change.  In this construction, the environment remains
unchanged if population growth is offset by a corresponding reduction in
consumption per capita or improvements in technology that reduce waste per unit50
of consumption.  This approach, as we have seen, has been used by Holdren
(1991), Harisson (1994) and Bongaarts (1992) in attributing and projecting CO2
emissions, as well as by Commoner (1991, 1992) in analyzing the environmental
impacts of population and development.  While in the I=PAT formulation the
three factors are equally weighted, Shaw (1989a,b,c) sought to qualitatively
differentiate between them by identifying consumption and technology as the
ultimate causes of environmental degradation, with population as an aggravating
factor.
(c)  The mediating-factor approach postulates that not only the magnitude but
also the direction (sign) of the effect of population on the environment is
determined by other factors, such as poverty, market demands, government
policies, and social and cultural factors.  These conditions and factors determine
whether population growth would lead to technological innovation or to
environmental degradation or out-migration (Marquette and Bilsborrow 1997,
Bilsborrow 1992a, 1992b, McNicoll 1990, Hogan 1990, Schmink 1994).  The
poverty-fertility-environment vicious circle fits best in this approach.
(d)  The development-dependency approach advocates that it is the
development process that mediates the population-environment interface.  In
particular, the dependency of the South or the North on export markets for natural
resources, technology, foreign investment and a variety of other international
economic and political dependencies shape both the observed demographic and
environmental outcomes (Jolly 1991, Martine 1992, 1993).  In this approach,
population growth and environmental degradation are spuriously (rather than
causally) related, both being driven by a third factor, the South-North
development dependency.
(e)  The systems approach to the population-environment relationship
combines ecological, socioeconomic and demographic systems into a web of
inter-relationships of which the population-environment nexus is only one.  In51
such complex, integrated systems, structural changes along a country’s
development path cause non-marginal shifts in population-environment dynamics.
The systems approach has been employed both at the macro level (e.g. Gallopin et
al. 1988, Hawley 1986, and Cleaver and Schreiber 1992) and at the micro or
household and community level (e.g. Bennett 1969, Fricke 1993, Wilk 1991, and
Viazzo 1989).
Studies also differ in the dimensions of population and environment they focus
on.  Most studies focus on population growth or population density.  Few consider the
spatial distribution of population and migration or issues related to health and education
and the demography of the household, such as family size and age, gender and power
structure.  With regard to the environment, the studies vary from those which focus on a
particular dimension (deforestation, land use, water, pollution, climate change) to those
that use general but vague concepts of resource depletion and environmental degradation.
This is important since the environment has many dimensions, some not easily
quantifiable.  Focusing on one dimension avoids difficult issues of valuation and
aggregation, but also ignores spillovers between environments, intermedia substitution
and shifting pressures from one resource or environment to another (e.g. from the rural
resource base to the urban environment through migration).  In this regard, the shifting of
population pressures from the local environment to the environment of other countries or
the global environment through international trade and globalization has received less
attention than either local studies abstracting from spillover effects or global studies
treating the world as a single unit.
This brings us to the final dimension of diversity: the level of analysis.  Here,
there are two categories: top-down (or macro) studies, and bottom-up (or micro) studies.
Macro-level studies use highly aggregate data on population and environment and units
of analysis that are countries, regions or the globe, while micro-level studies use highly
disaggregated data and units of analysis that are households and communities.  As such,
micro studies are closer to the level where decisions are made and hence they have much
more behavioral content than macro studies.  Also, micro-level studies can incorporate
more easily the socio-cultural and institutional context into the analysis and are best52
suited for analyzing cause and effect linkages between population and environment
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, Zaba and Clarke 1994, Bilsborrow and Geores 1994,
Marquette and Bilsborrow 1994, and Jacobson and Price 1990, among others).
Macro-level studies, on the other hand, are national or global assessments and
predictions of the likely environmental outcomes of broad demographic and economic
trends (e.g. Ridker 1979, Simon 1981, 1990, Bongaarts 1992, Meadows 1972 and 1992).
Such studies are useful in the formulation of national and global policies and the
identification of general hypotheses for testing at lower geographical levels (Marquette
and Bilsborrow 1994).  While both micro- and macro-level studies generate valuable and
often complementary insights into the population and environment interface (albeit in
different contexts), the wide conceptual gap that exists between the two approaches
produces seemingly contradictory results.  For example, micro studies may find
significant adverse effects of population pressures on the local environment, while macro
studies identify no resource constraints at the national or global level (or vice versa).  To
bridge the gap between the two, Marquette and Bilsborrow advocate more emphasis on
“middle-range theory and research, which explains as well as possible a limited
phenomena in a specific context” (p. 8).  Another approach to bridging the gap is to use
the macro approach to identify hypotheses for testing at the micro level; the result of such
tests would then be used to modify the specification of the population-environment
relationship at the macro level.  Ultimately, macro studies must be based on more solid
micro formulations than has been the case in the past, and micro studies must seek to
provide input into the answers of a wider set of policy questions faced by an increasingly
open and interdependent world.53
7. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to review analytically and critically the literature
on the population-environment interface.  The literature, beginning with Malthus 150
years ago, is vast and steadily growing.  We tried to be selective, yet cover all the major
schools of thought and strands of research.  Inevitable, some important contributions may
have been omitted.  There is little agreement on the relationship between population and
environment, not only on the magnitude but also on the direction (sign).  Some even
dispute whether such a relationship exists at all.  Empirical research has not been able to
resolve the issue because of limited data and divergent methodologies and levels of
analysis.  Any attempt to summarize the paper is tantamount to reproducing it.  Nor do
we offer any conclusions.  This is a task we gladly leave to the reader.54
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